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Competition Law for Developing Countries: A Proposal for an
Antitrust Regime in Peru
Spencer Weber Waller*
Rafael Muente**
prior to World War II, the United States was the principal country to
have a highly developed system of antitrust law. Since that time, most
of the developed market economy countries have promulgated some sys-
tem of laws to protect competition within their economy. While the
scope of the substantive rules and procedures within each system remains
a topic of heated debate, the idea of a regime of competition laws has
gained nearly universal acceptance among developed nations.
There is no similar acceptance of competition law among lesser de-
veloped nations. In many instances, the idea of competition laws seems
inconsistent with the overriding goal of national economic development.
In addition, the system of competition laws which seek to promote the
free interplay of market forces may be inconsistent with a national eco-
nomic system where government regulation or actual ownership of the
means of production is substantial.
This Article seeks to persuade that the implementation of a system
of competition laws is not inconsistent with the development goals of a
nominally market economy of a lesser developed country. Such a system
is in fact vital to the development of an effective national economy by
subjecting cartel practices and the abuse of a dominant position to legal
oversight and review. Such a regime would also prevent the exploitation
of monopoly power by both national and international firms.
In order to be effective, such a system would have to be tailored to-
the needs of each particular economy. While the antitrust laws of the
United States or the European Economic Community ("EEC") can serve
as a point of departure, they cannot be slavishly duplicated successfully
in a lesser developed country. This Article proposes a code of competi-
tion law for Peru taking into account the unique circumstances of the
Peruvian economy and legal structure. Part I of the Article describes the
attributes of developed antitrust systems such as in the United States and
* Attorney, Freeborn & Peters, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.; J.D., Northwestern University, 1982;
B.A., University of Michigan, 1979.
** L.L.B., Catholic University of Peru, 1986; M.A.L.S., ITI-Chicago/Kent College of Law
(1987). Abogado, Lima, Peru.
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the EEC. Part II describes the unique, legal, cultural, and economic con-
ditions which confront the drafters of a competition regime for Peru.
Part III sets forth the nascent antitrust laws which currently exist in
Peru. Part IV describes the abuse of those laws in the regulation of inter-
national businesses and part V proposes a model antitrust code for Peru,
including the procedures for effectively enforcing such laws.
I. THE ATTRIBUTES OF COMPETITION LAW
Competition law is premised on the belief that a highly competitive
market economy can efficiently allocate resources and ensure that con-
sumers will be able to obtain goods and services at the lowest possible
prices. Competition law thus seeks to prevent private action which
would interfere with these market forces.
Highly developed systems of competition law seem to share three
principal attributes. First, competition laws will prohibit, either through
civil or criminal penalties, the formation of cartel agreements pertaining
to price, production, and the allocation of territories or customers. Sec-
ond, competition laws will prohibit the actual or attempted abuse of a
dominant position or the exercise of monopoly power. Finally, most
such systems will also incorporate prophylactic rules aimed at prohibit-
ing market conditions conducive to the formation of cartels or monopo-
lies. Such rules typically include the restriction of certain mergers and
the registration of certain agreements between competitors with an ap-
propriate government agency.
In the United States, the first national antitrust legislation was
passed in 1890.1 At that time, the creation of a nationwide market econ-
omy was largely complete, and it was widely feared that a series of pow-
erful cartels, or trusts, would exploit their market power to the detriment
of both consumers and competitors.2 The result was the passage of the
Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibited all "contract[s],
combination[s] in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or commerce."3 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibited
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopo-
I Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988) [hereinafter Sherman Act].
2 P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 48-58 (1988).
3 Sherman Act, supra note 1, § 1.
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or,
if any other person, one hundred thousand, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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lize a market.4
Violations of the Sherman Act may be brought by either the govern-
ment or by a private plaintiff.5 Suits by the government can be either
criminal or civil.6 Subsequent legislation has increased the penalty such
that an individual convicted of a criminal antitrust violation can be im-
prisoned for up to three years and fined up to one million dollars.7 In a
civil antitrust suit, a private plaintiff can collect three times the actual
damages from a defendant plus the attorneys' fees and costs of the
litigation.8
In addition to the Sherman Act, the United States Congress in later
years passed additional antitrust legislation prohibiting a variety of ex-
clusionary practices such as exclusive dealing,9 price discrimination,1"
and mergers which tended to substantially lessen competition within a
market." Like the Sherman Act, these subsequent acts may be enforced
by either the government or a private plaintiff. 2
Consumer protection law in the United States developed along a dif-
ferent path. At the federal level, general responsibility has been dele-
gated to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to investigate and
prohibit unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive trade
practices.13 The FTC carries out its mandate through investigations, in-
4 Id. § 2.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court. Id
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 9, 15(a) (1988).
6 Id.
7 Id. §§ 1-2. Pursuant to the recently promulgated Federal Sentencing Guideline, a defendant
convicted of a criminal antitrust violation is no longer eligible for a sentence of straight probation,
and will ordinarily be sentenced to four to ten months of some form of incarceration.
8 Id. § 15(a).
9 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988) [hereinafter Clayton Act].
10 Clayton Act, supra note 9, § 13.
11 Id. § 18.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 9, 15 (1988).
13 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41(3) (1988) [hereinafter Federal Trade Com-
mission Act].
3. Purpose
[The] Federal Trade Commission Act (15 USCS §§ 41 et seq.) was designed to supple-
ment and bolster [the] Sherman and Clayton Acts [citations omitted].
[The] Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster [the]
Sherman and Clayton Acts by enabling [the] FTC to stop in their incipiency acts and
practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts [citations omitted].
[The] intent of [the] Federal Trade Commission Act is prevention of injury to [the]
general public [citation omitted].
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dividual administrative adjudications, and through the issuance of Trade
Regulation Rules of general applicability. Other federal consumer pro-
tection measures are enforced by the Consumer Products Safety Com-
mission and other executive and independent agencies which regulate
specific sectors of the economy, such as the Food and Drug Administra-
tion or the Department of Transportation. These federal efforts are sup-
plemented at the state and local levels by consumer protection divisions
of prosecutors' offices and consumer fraud and deceptive trade practice
statutes which give consumers or competitors a cause of action when
injured by such conduct.14
While certain of these agencies also enforce aspects of United States
competition law,15 their consumer protection responsibilities are handled
in a manner distinct from competition concerns.16 At the federal level,
the approach is typically regulatory and relies on administrative
processes rather than litigation as the initial fact finding process. More
importantly, consumer protection law seeks to protect consumers and
[The] great purpose of both [the] Federal Trade Commission Act and [the] Clayton
Act was to advance the] public interest by securing fair opportunity for play of contending
forces ordinarily engendered by honest desire for gain, and to this end it is essential that
those who adventure their time, skill, and capital should have large freedom of action in
conduct of their own affairs [citation omitted].
[The] Federal Trade Commission was created with [the] avowed purpose of lodging
administrative functions committed to it in [a] body specially competent to deal with them
by reason of information, experience, and careful study of business and economic condi-
tions of industry affected, and was organized in such manner as would give to them oppor-
tunity to acquire expertness in dealing with these special questions concerning industry
that comes from experience [citation omitted].
[The] Federal Trade Commission Act is [a] measure in which Congress has relied
upon [the] initiative of administration officials and flexibility of administrative process to
preserve and promote competition, and [the] Commission alone is empowered to develop
that enforcement policy best calculated to achieve ends contemplated by Congress [citation
omitted].
[The] Federal Trade Commission Act (15 USCS §§ 41 et seq.) was intended to protect
not just sophisticated people, but rather that vast multitude which includes [the] ignorant,
unthinking, and credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are
governed by appearances and general impressions [citation omitted].
15 U.S.C.S. § 41(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988). For example, most states have statutes modeled to some degree
after the Federal Trade Commission Act.
See, e.g., Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 121 ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 1211/2, para. 269-270 (Smith-Hurd 1989) (creating private remedy for injunctive relief, actual
damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs for a wide range of deceptive and unfair acts
including conduct constituting a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
15 For example, the United States Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of
Transportation have the power to approve or deny mergers in the industries subject to their
jurisdiction.
16 For example, the staff of the Federal Trade Commission is divided into separate Bureaus of
Competition and Consumer Protection.
Vol. 21:159
ANTITRUST IN PERU
competitors from conduct which may have a tendency to deceive as to a
material fact without necessarily having any appreciable effect on compe-
tition or markets as a whole.
The other principal system of competition law can be found within
the EEC. The EEC was founded in 1957 through the implementation of
the Treaty of Rome 7 which sought as its primary aim to create a single
integrated European market for goods and services. The EEC has ex-
panded from its original six members to include virtually all of the devel-
oped market economies in Western Europe." The principal competition
provisions of the Treaty of Rome are contained in articles 85 through
90,19 and have as their principal goal the creation of a transnational Eu-
ropean economy without artificial barriers to trade.2" Thus, the role of
competition law in the EEC is broader than that in the United States,
since it must both protect competition for its own sake and promote the
continued integration of national economies.
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits agreements, understand-
ings, and concerted practices among firms which have as their purpose or
effect the restriction of competition.2' In keeping with the goal of contin-
ued economic integration, article 85 incorporates an explicit exception
17 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
18 The current members of the EEC are: United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, West Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Denmark.
19 Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, arts. 85-90. Article 85 prohibits agreements between under-
taking which have as their purpose or effect to restrict trade between member states. Article 86
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the Community. Article 87 gives the European
Commission the power to adopt regulations and directives to enforce articles 85 and 86. Article 90
applies the, general principles of Articles 85 and 86 to public enterprise within the EEC.
20 Id.
21 Id. art. 85, § 1-2. Articles 85 §§ 1 and 2 state:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall
hereby be prohibited: any agreement between enterprises, any decisions by associations of
enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Mem-
ber States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of addi-
tional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null and void.
1989]
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for agreements among competitors which promote the aims and goals of
the EEC without unduly restricting competition.22 Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the
common market. 23 Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome applies these anti-
trust prohibitions on a limited basis to enterprises owned by member
states.24 While the prohibitions contained in articles 85 and 86 have been
22 Id. art. 85 § 3. Article 85 § 3 states:
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph I may be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or classes of agreements between enterprises;
- any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
- any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to the improve-
ment of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or eco-
nomic progress while reserving to users an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom,
and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable to
the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial
proportion of the goods concerned.
Enterprises seeking approval that agreements do not fall within the prohibitions of
Article 85(1) and (2) must apply for formal "negative clearance" or an informed letter of
comfort from the European Commission. Enterprises seeking approval for agreements
pursuant to Article 85(3) must also apply to the European Commission unless the agree-
ment falls within one of the block exemptions issued by the Commission.
23 Id. art. 86. Article 86 states:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby,
action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position
within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incom-
patible with the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or of
any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(e) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of
additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contract.
Id.
24 Id. art. 90. Article 90 states:
1. Member States shall, in respect of public enterprises and enterprises to which they grant
special or exclusive rights, neither exact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the
rules contained in this Treaty, in particular, to those rules provided for in article 7 and in
articles 85 to 94 inclusive.
2. Any enterprise charged with the management of services of general economic interest or
having the character of a fiscal monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this
Treaty, in particular to those governing competition, to the extent that the application of
such rules does not obstruct the dejure or defacto fulfillment of the specific tasks entrusted
to such enterprise. The development of trade may not be affected to such a degree as
would be contrary to the interests of the Community.
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applied to joint ventures25 and mergers, 26 until recently there has been no
explicit regulation relating to mergers currently in force in the EEC.27
Almost all of the major trading partners of the United States have
some form of competition law. This includes Canada,28 Great Britain,29
West Germany,30 and Japan,31 among others. The principal variations
among systems depend on whether the principal source of enforcement
lies with a government agency or with private plaintiffs, the use of civil
versus criminal sanctions, and the amount of discretion of courts and
antitrust enforcers to take into account non-competition issues in making
determinations under the relevant national competition laws.
II. THE ECONOMY AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF PERU
The study of antitrust legislation is conditioned by the characteris-
tics of the economy and culture of the society in which the legislation is
to be applied. Therefore, a sophisticated political and economic analysis
of the activities carried out by the enterprises in a national economy is an
important aid in designing competition legislation for that country. Un-
fortunately, in the case of Peru, there is little detailed research as to the
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this article and shall,
where necessary, issue appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.
This doctrine contrasts the antitrust laws of the United States which generally exempt the anticom-
petitive acts of governmental units.
For instance, states, acting within their sovereign capacity, may regulate agriculture without
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. See, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Furthermore, an
entity owned and operated by the United States government is immune from antitrust liability. See,
Sea-Land Air Service, Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919
(1982).
U.S. policy is consistent with the United States view that the purpose of competition law is to
restrain undue private economic power. The broader policy of the EEC in attackingpublic restraints
is related to the necessity of creating a true common market free of all restraints which tend to
perpetuate national boundaries.
Id.
25 British-American Tobacco Company Limited and R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. E.C.
Commission, 2 Com. Mkt. L.R. 551 (1987).
26 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. E.C. Commission (Case
6/72), 6 Com. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973).
27 The EEC has considered adopting a merger regulation since the 1970's. The EEC merger
regulation finally adopted on December 21, 1989 requires prior notification of transnational mergers
where the parties have combined worldwide turnover of approximately $5 billion and at least two of
the parties have a combined turnover within the community of at least $250 million.
28 G. KAISER, COMPETITION LAWS OF CANADA (1988).
29 See generally, W. ALLAN & G. HOGAN, COMPETITION LAWS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (1988).
30 Federal Republic of Germany, Bv OVERVIEW, WORLD LAWS OF COMPETITION (Mathew
Bender 1986).
31 See generally, M. ARIGA, COMPETITION LAWS OF THE PACIFIC RIM COUNTRIES (1988).
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industrial organization of the Peruvian economy or the extent of signifi-
cant cartels or firms with dominant positions within Peru.
In general, Peru consists of three regions, an ard coastal strip which
supports most of the population, the Andes Mountains which cover more
than twenty-five percent of the territory, and the Amazon jungle which
covers more than half of the country. Peru is a lesser developed country
dependant on agriculture, commodities, and minerals for its principal
sources of revenue. Over forty percent of the work force is devoted to
agriculture. Per capita income is low, and Peru's modest trade surplus is
more than made up by the significant interest and principal payments
Peru owes on its foreign debts.
Since the late 1960's, Peru has participated in the Andean Group,32
a common market composed of the principal South American countries.
32 Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and
Peru, 8 International Legal Materials 910 [hereinafter Andean Common Market Treaty].
CHAPTER I
OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONS
Article 1. The present Agreement has as its goals: to promote a balanced and harmo-
nious development of the Member States, to accelerate this development through economic
integration, to expedite their participation in the integration processes as stipulated in the
Montevideo Treaty, and to create a climate favorable to the conversion of LAFTA into a
common market, all of these designed to secure the progressive improvement of the living
standards of the peoples of the Subregion.
Article 2. A balanced and harmonious development must be conducive to an equitable
distribution of the benefits resulting from integration of the Member States by effecting a
reduction of the existing discriminations that aggravate them. The achievements of the
process should be periodically assessed, taking into account, among other factors, its effect
on the expansion of global exports of each State, the conduct of its trade balance with
respect to the Subregion, the development of its gross territorial product, the generation of
new employment, and its capital formation.
Article 3. To achieve the goals set by the present Agreement, the enumerated opera-
tions and measures shall be employed, inter alia:
(a) Coordination of economic and social policies, and unification of domestic law in
pertinent fields;
(b) Joint programming, intensified subregional industrialization processes, and execu-
tion of Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development;
(c) Greater acceleration in the trade liberalization program than that adopted gener-
ally within the LAFTA framework;
(d) A common external tariff, attained by progressive stages through a minimum
common external tariff;
(e) Programs directed toward stimulation of development in the agricultural and live-
stock sector;
(f) Channelling of resources from inside and outside the Subregion to provide invest-
ment financing necessary to the Integration Process;
(g) Physical integration; and
(h) Preferential treatment to be accorded to Bolivia and Ecuador.
Article 4. For the better achievement of the present Agreement, the Member States
shall undertake the necessary efforts to seek adequate solutions for the problems arising
from the land encirclement of Bolivia.
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Minor manufactured products are sold to the different member states
without the imposition of tariffs. This common market has not resulted
in a significant expansion of the Peruvian or Andean economy and has
not worked as efficiently as expected.
The Peruvian legal system can be explained in most basic terms as a
civil law system based on the Roman and French model.33 The system is
derived from the Roman legal tradition that has been preserved and de-
veloped by most of the continental European countries. In the case of
Peru, the legal system was heavily influenced by the approximately three
centuries of Spanish colonial rule.
The civil law system is based on abstract provisions contained in a
organized body of law called the civil code.3' The civil code contains
provisions that regulate all aspects of a person's legal relationships from
birth to death.35 The civil code usually includes its own rules of interpre-
tation and application, and would cover areas of family law, real prop-
erty and its transfer, natural and artificial persons, including
corporations, torts, contracts, as well as rules of private international law
and conflicts of law.36
Code provisions are interpreted and applied to specific legal situa-
tions according to the rules and methods of interpretations contained
within the code.37 The civil code rules are applied by analogy in the
absence of specific provisions covering a particular area or set of circum-
stances.38 Under such a system, the role of the judiciary is limited to the
interpretation and application of the rules contained within the code,
rather than the development of judge made precedents familiar to stu-
dents of the common law.
39
Peru uses a civil code based on Napoleonic law as modified by the
Peru Civil Code of 1984.4 The provisions of the civil code are intended
to be of a general and permanent nature and consequently are difficult to
33 See generally, M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LAW TRADI-
TIONS IN A NUTSHELL (1985) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW]; A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY,
THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM (1977) [hereinafter CIVIL LAW]; J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADI-
TION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
(1985).
34 J. MERRYMAN, supra note 33, at 27-34.
35 Id.
36 COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 33, at 101-18.
37 Id. at 211-32.
38 Id.
39 CIVIL LAWV, supra note 33, 567-89. Where codes are silent as to a particular subject and
silent as to interpretation, the process of judicial decisionmaking as to legislative intent, may mostly
closely resemble a common law jurisdiction.
40 Codigo Civil (Edicion Official) (Ministerio de Justicia 1984) (entered into force November
14, 1984, pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 295).
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modify or amend.41 This is also true for the Peru criminal code,4 2 a sepa-
rate body of law, also by tradition of a fixed and permanent nature. Any
attempt to craft antitrust provisions regulating the conduct of firms and
individuals must take into account the rigid provisions of both codes.
III. CURRENT PERUVIAN LAW RELATING TO COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. The Constitutional Framework
An analysis of the current Peruvian law relating to competition be-
gins with the provisions contained in Title 3 of the Peruvian Constitution
governing the economic regime of Peru. 3 Title 3 of the Constitution
begins with the declaration that Peru will have a social market econ-
omy.4 The most concrete constitutional provision relating to competi-
41 There have been only three Civil Codes in modem Peruvian legal history enacted in 1852,
1936 and 1984. The 1984 code was the result of a lengthy struggle prompted by the work of two
separate Law Commissions in 1980, and subsequent Commissions in 1981 and 1984. See DELIA
REVOREDO DE DEBAKERY, CODIGO CIVIL, ANTECEDENTS, LEGISLATIVOS, COMPARACION CON EL
CONDIGO DE 1936 (1985).
42 The current criminal code entered into force on July 28, 1924. See generally, Codigo Penal,
Codigo de Procedimientos Penales, Codigo de Ejecucion Penal, Reglamento (Cultural Cuzco, S.A.,
editors 1986). The Criminal Code has also been subject to recent efforts to revise. See Comision
Revisora de Los Codigos Penal Y Procedimientos Penales, El Peruano, April 1I, 1985; Proyecto de
Codigo Penal, El Peruano September 3, 1984.
43 LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE PERU (1979) Titulo III, Del Regimen Economico [herein-
after PERU CONSTITUTION I]. Taken from A. BLAUSTEIN & 0. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (P. Heller translation 1986) [hereinafter PERU CONSTITUTION II].
44 PERU CONSTITUTION I, supra note 43, arts. 110-11. Articulo 110* - 1110 establecido
ARTICULO 1 l0°-E1 regimen econ6mico de la Repfblica se fundamenta en
principios de justicia social orientados a la dignificaci6n del trabajo como fuente principal
de riqueza y como medio de realizaci6n de la persona humana. El Estado promueve el
desarrollo econ6mico y social mediante el incremento de la producci6n y de la produc-
tividad, Ia racional utilizaci6n do los recursos, el pleno empleo y la distribuci6n equitativa
del ingreso. Con igual finalidad, fomenta los diversos sectores de la producci6n y defiende
el inter6s do los consumidores.
ARTICULO 11 I-EI Estado formula Ia politica econ6mica y social mediante planes
de desarrollo que regulan la actividad del Sector Pfiblico y orientan en forma concertada ]a
actividad de los Demis sectores. La planificaci6n una vez concertada es de cumplimiento
obligatorio.
See also PERU CONSTITUTION II, supra note 43, arts. I10-11. Titulo III Economic Organiza-
tion Chapter I 110-111 states:
Article 110. The economic system of the Republic is based on principles of social
justice oriented to the dignifying of work as the principal source of wealth and as a means
for the fulfillment of the human person.
The State promotes economic and social development through an increase in produc-
tion and productivity, the rational use of resources, full employment, and the equitable
distribution of income. With the same purpose it promotes the various sectors of produc-
tion and protects the interest of consumers.
Article 111. The State formulates economic and social policy through development
Vol. 21:159
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tion is article 133 which reads:
"Monopolies, oligopolies, practices and agreements which are restrictive
in the industrial and mercantile activities are prohibited. The law assures
the normal activity of the market and establishes the corresponding
sanctions."4
Article 133 incorporates a broad sweeping constitutional prohibition
of restrictive business practices. The article does not directly mention
restrictive business practices related to services, but such practices most
likely would be covered under its provisions relating to mercantile activi-
ties. However, the literal language of article 133 cannot be read as to
include attempts to monopolize, a practice covered under United States
antitrust law.
While this provision is the law of the land in Peru, it only establishes
broad parameters which must be enforced through the issuance of regu-
lations. The regulations must be promulgated by the Peruvian legislature
or the executive upon delegation from the legislature. To date, no regu-
lations enforcing article 133 have been issued. Unlike the United States,
a judge in Peru may not enter a judgment applying this constitutional
provision in the absence of the implementing regulations.
Article 133 must also be understood in the context of article 130,
which states that all enterprises are "units of production whose efficiency
and contribution to the common welfare are demandable by the state,
according to the law."46 Thus, the Constitution grants the government
of Peru broad social welfare powers in the regulation of economic
activity.
The enforcement of competition law in Peru is complicated by the
traditionally large role of the Peruvian government in the national econ-
omy. Article 114 of the Constitution authorizes a broad public sector as
well as economic regulation in stating: "For a cause of social interest or
national security, the law can reserve for the state productive or service
activities. For the same causes the state can establish the reserving of
such activities in favor of Peruvian nationals." 47
plans which regulate the operations of the public sector and orient the activity of the other
sectors in concerted fashion. Once it is concerted, the use of planning is mandatory.
45 PERU CONSTITUTION I, supra note 43, art. 133. Articulo 133" establecido: "Estin
prohibidos los nomopolios, oligopolios, acaparamientos, pricticas y acuerdos restrictivos en la ac-
tividad industrial y mercantil. La Icy asegura ]a normal actividad del mercado y establece las san-
ciones correspondientes."
46 PERU CONSTITUTION I, supra note 43, art. 130. Articulo 130 establecido: "Las empresas,
cualquiera sea su modalidad, son unidades de producci6n cuya eficiencia y contribuci6n al bien
comin son exigibles por el Estado de acuerdo con la ley." PERU CONSTITUTION II, supra note 43,
art. 130. Article 130 states: "Enterprises, whatever their nature, are production units whose effi-
ciency and contribution to the common welfare may be sought by the State, in accordance with the
law."
47 PERU CONSTITUTION I, supra note 43, art. 114. Articulo 114" establecido: "Por causa dee
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The government is particularly active in the regulation of interna-
tional trade and foreign investment. Article 137 of the Constitution
states:
The State authorizes, registers, and supervises direct foreign invest-
ment and the transfer of foreign technology as complementary to their
domestic counterparts as long as they promote employment, the capi-
talization of the country, the participation of domestic capital, and
contribute to development in accordance with economic plans and the
policy of integration.48
While this is not a competition regulation per se, it necessarily re-
lates to the activities carried out by international and foreign enterprises
within the country. Unlike the case with article 133, the powers of the
government to regulate foreign investment and technology are spelled
out in enforceable regulations.49 In addition to the regulations issued
under article 137 of the Constitution, the government can also rely on the
powers granted to members of the Andean group to regulate foreign
investment.5 °
interns social o seguridad nacional, ]a ley puede reservar para el Estado actividades productivas o de
servicios. Por iguales causas puede tambi~n el Estado establecer reserva dedichas actividades en
favor de los Peruanos." PERU CONSTITUTION II, supra note 43, art. 114. Article 114 states that:
"For social purposes or national security, the law can reserve for the State production activities or
services. For similar reasons the State can also establish limits on said activities in favor of Peruvian
citizens."
48 PERU CONSTITUTION I, supra note 43, art. 137. Articulo 137" establecido: "El Estado
autoriza, registra y supervisa Ia inversi6n extranjera directa y Ia transferencia de tecnologia forbmea
como complementarias de las nacionales, siempre que estimulen el empleo, ]a capitalizaci6n del pais,
]a participaci6n del capital nacional, y contribuyan al desarrollo en concordancia con los planes
econ6micos y ]a politica de integraci6n."
49 For the text of article 133, see supra note 45.
50 Andean Common Market Treaty, supra note 32, arts. 25-31.
CHAPTER III
COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
Article 25. The Member States shall adopt a strategy for Subregional development
based on the following fundamental goals:
(a) Acceleration of the economic development of the Member States on an equitable
basis;
(b) Increased generation of employment opportunities;
(c) Improvement in the position of Member States and of the Subregion as a unit in
matters of foreign trade and balance of payments;
(d) Overcoming of infrastructure problems which are presently hindering economic
development;
(e) Reduction in the existing discrimination of development levels among the Member
States; and
(f) Achieving a maximum utilization of scientific and technological progress, and ac-
tivation of research in these fields.
Article 26. The Member States shall initiate immediately a coordinated procedure in
their development planning in specific sectors, and a harmonization of their economic and
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B. Legislative Developments
The efforts to develop a legislative framework to implement a sys-
tem of competition law in Peru date back to 1980.51 Most competition
provisions in Peru are aimed more at consumer protection, rather than
competition, goals. Pure competition legislation is almost nonexistent.
For example, the 1982 General Industries Law of Peru establishes an
office for the defense of consumers within the Ministry of Industry, Tour-
ism and Integration. 2 While some of the objectives of the law are to
social policies, directed toward future adoption of a concerted planning system for the
integrated development of the area.
These processes shall be employed simultaneously and in coordination with the forma-
tion of a subregional market, utilizing the following machinery, inter alia:
(a) A system of industrial programming;
(b) A special system for the agricultural-livestock sector;
(c) Plans for physical and social infrastructure;
(d) Coordination of exchange, monetary, financial and fiscal policies, whether use of
Subregional capital is to be made within or outside of the area;
(e) A common trade policy with respect to third countries; and
(f) Harmonization of planning methods and techniques.
Article 2Z Prior to 31 December 1970, the Commission, at the proposal of the Board,
shall approve and present for consideration of the Member States, a common system for
treatment of foreign capital and, likewise, systems for trademarks, patents, licenses and
royalties, inter alia.
The Member States pledge themselves to adopt the measures necessary to implement
such systems within the six months following approval by the Commission.
Article 28. Prior to 31 December 1971, the Commission, at the proposal of the Board,
shall approve and recommend to the Member States a uniform system to govern multina-
tional enterprises.
Within the same period of time, the Commission, at the proposal of the Board, shall
issue directives to serve as a guide for the unification of legislation on industrial incentives
in the Member States.
The States shall pledge themselves to adopt all measures necessary to implement this
unification within the six months following Commission approval.
Article 29. The Commission, at the proposal of the Board, and at the latest by 31
December 1970, shall establish the permanent procedures and machinery necessary to
achieve the coordination and unification defined in article 26.
Article 30. The Commission, at the proposal of the Board, shall adopt a program of
common instrumentation and machinery to govern foreign trade in the Member States, to
be put into effect by the latter prior to 31 December 1972. An exception to the preceding
shall be the Common External Customs Tariff which shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter VI.
Article 3L In their national development plans and in the formulation of their eco-
nomic policy, the Member States shall incorporate those measures required to insure com-
pliance with the preceding articles.
Id.
51 Decree laws (17) 21411 and 22963. Repealed by Legislative Decree (18) 123 of June 12,
1981.
52 Ley General de Industrias, No. 23407, May 28, 1982, reprinted in Tomo 115 Normas
Legales (1982).
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guarantee competition in the production and sale of goods, the law fo-
cuses on compliance with established quality standards and a rigorous
protection of the consumer and Peruvian industry against unfair
competition.53
The 1981 Legislative Decree No. 133 represents a step toward the
creation of a national competition law.54 The law imposes criminal sanc-
tions as well as fines on individuals who withhold from the market cer-
tain items designated by the government as priority goods.55 The law
prohibits the withholding of these goods as part of any effort to raise
price or limit demand in order to charge supra-competitive prices.56
Similarly, article 2 of the decree imposes criminal sanctions and fines on
any manufacturer of goods who attempts to sell designated priority items
at prices above those set by regulation 7.5  Article 3 of the decree imposes
both criminal and civil sanctions on individuals who alter or tamper with
the quality, quantity, or measure of designated priority articles.58 Article
4 contains provisions for increased penalties for any violations commit-
ted at times of civil unrest or public emergency.59
However commendable, this law hardly constitutes a national com-
petition regime for Peru. First, the law only applies to certain products
designated by the government. Second, the decree prohibits only price
increases or the withholding from the market of the designated goods.
The scope of this decree is very limited and simply does not deal with
free competition and competitive market conditions, but focuses on con-
sumer protection concerns.
In late 1985, the present government issued Supreme Decree No.
467-85-EF.6° This is the one law that most closely resembles traditional
notions of antitrust and competition law. The passage of this decree is,
however, troubling. President Garcia simply issued this decree by execu-
tive fiat. The legislature neither considered nor passed any of the provi-
sions contained within the decree. Although the preamble to the decree
states that it is necessary to issue provisions to regulate the restrictive
business practices of enterprises on behalf of the public interest while the
national parliament legislates on the matter, to date the legislature has
never considered any such legislation.61
53 Id. arts. 1-C & I-D.
54 Legislative Decree No. 133, June 12, 1981, reprinted in Tomo 109 Normas Legales (1981).
55 Id. art. 1.
56 Id.
57 Id. art. 2.
58 Id. art. 3.
59 Id. art. 4.
60 Published in El Peruano, June 11, 1985, reprinted in 409 INFORMATIVO LEGAL 492 (Camara
de Comercio de Lima November 1985).
61 Id.
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The decree declares that it is in the public interest to protect con-
sumers against the abuses derived from enterprises with dominant posi-
tions in the market.62 The decree defines a dominant position as an
enterprise or group of enterprises involved in the production or distribu-
tion of products or services that individually or jointly have at least 75%
of the market.63 The decree also establishes a regime of regulation for
those enterprises found to have dominant positions and requires such
firms to report to the government such items as costs of production, com-
mercial and sales costs, financial expenditures and profit margins for
their sales and investments." Such information is to be used by the gov-
ernment to regulate prices for goods and products purchased by
consumers.
65
Under the decree, the Ministry of Economics and Finances estab-
lishes prices for firms with a dominant position.66 Enterprises that fail to
comply with the price regulations can be fined and/or expropriated by
the state.67 The decree further permits the government to exclude from
the scope of the regulations any state industries.68
There are significant problems and limitations to this decree. First,
the executive has never issued implementing regulations as required by
its own decree. Second, despite its preamble, the decree only achieves a
small fraction of the goals of free competitive markets associated with
antitrust or competition systems. The focus of the decree is limited to
the treatment of enterprises with dominant positions in the market with-
out directly addressing the treatment of cartels. While anticompetitive
agreements of firms jointly occupying a dominant position would fall
within the scope of the decree, there are no concrete provisions dealing
with price fixing, limitation of production, or the allocation of territories
and customers among competing firms.
The second major weakness of the decree relates to the definition of
a dominant position. There appears to be no basis for the selection of
75% market share as the threshold for finding of dominant position.
There is no evidence of any kind of economic study preceding the decree
that would support the selection of this figure. The 75% threshold when
measured against other systems of competition law, appears to be both
too high a figure and too inflexible.
Finally, the decree only attempts to regulate the prices of firms with
dominant position and does not seek to control or eliminate their market
62 Id.
63 Id. art. 2.
64 Id. art. 3.
65 Id.
66 Id. art. 4.
67 Id. art. 5.
68 Id. art. 6.
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power or anticompetitive practices. The decree does not even contain a
direct prohibition against monopolies or oligopolies as seemingly re-
quired by article 133 of the Constitution.69
IV. THE NESTLE CASE AND THE ABUSE OF ANTITRUST LAW
The legislative provisions discussed above provided the basis for the
principal spectacular, but flawed, application of competition law in Peru.
On July 29, 1986, the government issued Supreme Decree 238-86-EF
which effectively expropriated the most important milk producing com-
pany in Peru and forced the sale of the firm to Peruvian nationals. This
extraordinary decree concerned Gloria, S.A., a company incorporated
under Peruvian law, which produced evaporated milk. Gloria, S.A. was
owned by Perulak, S.A., another company incorporated in Peru, which
controlled 100% of the processing and the production of evaporated milk
in the country. Perulak was at the time a subsidiary of Nestle, S.A., the
Swiss multi-national corporation.
The decree arose out of technical factors which forced Gloria, S.A.
to dramatically decrease the production of milk, producing a scarcity in
central and southern parts of Peru, especially in the capitol city of Lima.
As the shortages grew more acute, the government issued the Supreme
Decree which established governmental control over the operations of
Gloria, S.A. and required Nestle, S.A. to arrange for the sale of its shares
in Perulak to Peruvian persons or enterprises.
The government based the Supreme Decree on the prohibition of
monopolies contained in article 133 of the Constitution and on Supreme
Decree 467-85-EF.7° These decrees and provisions, when taken in com-
bination with article 133 of the Constitution, appear to permit the state
to intervene in those enterprises which fail to comply with the terms of
decrees designed to protect the consumer against enterprises with domi-
nant positions in the market or with monopoly power. However, the
detailed examination of these provisions as stated above, suggest that the
Nestle case reflects an abuse of executive power under the guise of com-
petition concerns. While article 133 of the Constitution prohibits the
existence of monopolies, oligopolies, practices and agreements which
may be restrictive of free trade, no regulations currently exist to apply
the law to persons within Peru.
Supreme Decree 467-85-EF is also simply inapplicable to the case of
Nestle, S.A. and its subsidiaries in Peru. While the decree establishes
sanctions and even intervention by the state in the event of a failure to
comply with governmental regulations, there is no evidence that Gloria,
S.A. or Perulak, S.A. was even subject to the decree.
69 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 45, 59-68 and accompanying text.
Vol. 21:159
ANTITRUST IN PER U
In order for the decree to have been applicable, evaporated milk
must have been placed on a list of items of first priority by the govern-
ment. In addition, the government would have had to have established
price regulations for the sale of evaporated milk. Third, the government
would have to have established that Nestle, S.A. and its subsidiary had
violated those pricing regulations in order to justify the intervention in
the internal affairs of the company. In promulgating the expropriation
and forced sale of Nestle, S.A.'s evaporated milk subsidiaries, the govern-
ment made no showing as to any of these points concerning the violation
of Supreme Decree 467.
Moreover, Supreme Decree 238 itself violates several provisions of
the Peruvian Constitution. Article 125 of the Constitution guarantees
the protection of private property and states that no one can be deprived
of property except for purposes of public need in accordance with due
process of law and with previous payment of just compensation.71 Arti-
cle 126 establishes national treatment for foreigners including both natu-
ral and juridic persons for the application of Peruvian law regarding the
holding or transfer of property.7"
71 PERU CONSTrrUTION I, supra note 43, art. 125. Articulo 125" establicido:
La propiedad es inviolable. El Estado la garantiza. A nadie puede privarse de ]a suya
sino por causa de necesidad y utilidad pfiblicas o de interns social, declarada conforme a
ley, y previo pago en dinero de indemnizaci6n justipreciada.
La ley establece las normas de procedimiento, valorizaci6n, caducidad y abandono.
En ]a expropiaci6n por causa de guerra, de calamidad pdfblica para reforma agraria o
remodelaci6n do centros poblados o para aprovechar fuentes de energia, el pago de la in-
demnizaci6n justipreciada puede hacerse en efectivo por armadas o en bonos de aceptaci6n
obligatoria y libre disposici6n, redimibles forzosamente en dinero. En tales casos la ley
sefiala el monto de la emisi6n, plazos adecuados de pago, intereses reajustables peri6dica-
mente, asi como ]a parte de la indemnizaci6n que debe pagarse necesariamente en dinero y
en forma previa.
PERU CONSTITUTION II, supra note 43, art. 125. Article 125 states:
Property is inviolable. The State guarantees it. No one can be deprived of his prop-
erty except by virtue of public necessity and convenience or public interest, declared ac-
cording to law, and the previous cash payment of an appropriately appraised indemnity.
The law establishes the norms of procedures, valuation, lapsing, and abandonment of
property.
In expropriation on account of war, public calamity, agrarian reform, or the revamp-
ing of populated centers or to exploit sources of energy, the payment of an appropriately
appraised indemnity can be made through installments or obligatory and freely negotiable
acceptance bonds mandatorily redeemable in cash. In such cases the law determines the
amount of the issue, adequate terms of payment, periodically readjustable interest, as well
as the share of indemnity which must mandatorily be paid in cash and in the previous
form.
72 PERU CONSTITUTION I, supra note 43, art. 126. Articulo 126" establicido:
La propiedad se rige exclusivamente por las leyes de 14 Republica.
En cuanto a ]a propiedad, los extranjeros, personas naturales o juridicas, estin en ]a
misma condici6n que loe peruanos, sin que, en caso alguno, puedan invocar al respecto
situaciones de excepci6n ni proteci6n diplomdtica.
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More to the point, the government in the Nestle, S.A. case simply
ignored the express limitations of Supreme Decree 467. The decree does
not by its own terms prohibit monopolies or oligopolies or create a rem-
edy of divestment. 3 It simply establishes a series of regulations concern-
ing the control of monopolies producing goods of first priority.74 The
failure of Supreme Decree 467 to cover the Nestle, S.A. situation, reflects
the dangers of utilizing inappropriate legislation without the protections
of due process of law to achieve a desired result. It also reflects the need
for real antitrust legislation in Peru which can be applied in an even-
handed and non-discriminatory manner.
V. A SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST CODE FOR PERU
The need for an effective antitrust regime in Peru is vital although
the current state of the laws regarding competition is disappointing. The
progress toward an effective system of competition laws in Peru has been
agonizingly slow. The legislative developments in the past six years have
offered little evidence of an effective system concerning restrictive busi-
ness practices or monopoly power.
There have been two principal deterrents to the development of such
a system. The first is a lack of appreciation of the role of antitrust law in
providing for the development of the Peruvian economy and national
welfare. Public opinion is a vital component of any movement for legis-
lative reform and was crucial in the development of similar competition
laws in the United States and the European Economic Community.
The second principal and related impediment to the development of
antitrust law in Peru has been the lack of specialized legal and economic
knowledge as to the existence and effect of restrictive business practices
in Peru. Such a program of economic and legal study would be vital for
developing support for the goals of antitrust as well as identifying those
factors that are unique to the Peruvian economy and its different mar-
Sin embargo, dentro de cincuenta kil6metros de las fronteras, los extranjeros no
pueden adquirir ni poseer, por ningfin titulo, minas, tierras, bosques, aguas, combustibles
ni fuentes de energia, directa ni indirectamente, individualmente ni en sociedad bajo pena
de perder, en beneficio del Estado, el derecho adquirido. Se exceptfia el caso de necesidad
nacional declarada por ley expresa.
PERU CONsTrrUTION II, supra note 43, art. 126. Article 126 states:
As regards property, foreigners, natural, or juridical persons enjoy the same status as
Peruvians without, in any case, their being able to invoke exceptional situations or diplo-
matic immunity.
However, within 50 kilometers of the borders, foreigners cannot acquire or possess,
for any reason, mines, land, forests, waters, fuel or sources of energy, directly or indirectly,
individually or collectively, subject to their losing, to the benefit of the state, their acquired
right. An exception is made in a case of national need declared by express law.
73 See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
74 Id.
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kets.75 In particular, such a study is necessary to focus on the geographic
divisions within the Peruvian economy as well as those markets with a
reduced and limited demand for goods and services which need not be
treated in the same manner as those sectors of the economy with diversi-
fied and powerful free market forces at work.
Such a study would lay the groundwork for a competition code
which would protect the Peruvian economy and consumers from all
kinds of restrictive business practices and the abuse of monopoly power.
At the same time, such a study would provide the empirical data to es-
tablish equitable treatment for small and medium size enterprises or cer-
tain segments of the economy that are critical to Peru's developmental
needs. Such a study would also be vital for the establishment of the
mechanisms and governmental institutions necessary to enforce antitrust
law in Peru, and permit Peru to participate in the bilateral and multilat-
eral enforcement of competition law on an international scale. While the
development of the precise provisions of a true Peruvian antitrust law
must await the conclusion of such a study, certain parameters can be
identified in advance and guide the necessary economic research.
A. Scope of Coverage
A vital preliminary question relates to the nature of entities that will
be subject to any Peruvian system of competition law. In order to be
truly effective, any system of competition law must cover both goods, and
services. In addition, the act must cover the activities of both individuals
and enterprise without regard to nationality.
A separate issue relates to the coverage of the act vis-a-vis govern-
mental actions. For both theoretical and practical reasons, any system of
Peruvian competition law will have to exclude the acts of the Peruvian
government. Since the turn of the century, antitrust law in the United
States has been conceived as a restraint on the exercise of private eco-
nomic power to the detriment of citizens and national ideals.76 United
States antitrust law specifically exempts activities by the federal govern-
ment from antitrust scrutiny and severely limits the effect of antitrust on
state and local government.77 Similarly, the Treaty of Rome limits the
liability of states for anticompetitive conduct.7" This approach should be
incorporated in Peru as an appropriate limitation on antitrust law in gen-
eral, a practical recognition of the activist role of the Peruvian govern-
ment in the national economy, and the reality that the national
75 The comprehensive economic studies undertaken in the United States in the 1930s similarly
established the ground work for effective post-World War II antitrust enforcement.
76 See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
77 See cases cited, supra note 24.
78 Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, art. 90.
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government would prevent implementation of any competition law with-
out such an exemption.
B. Substantive Provisions
While the objectives of a system of competition law can be easily
agreed upon, the specific modes for implementing these goals are not self-
evident. In the case of Peru, the objectives of a system of national com-
petition law would be to promote competition, enhance consumer access
to a market for goods and services, promote trade and economic develop-
ment, and limit the abuse of dominant positions in the market.
The broad prohibitions found in United States antitrust law are
probably inappropriate in the case of Peru. First, such broad prohibi-
tions, filled in through judicial interpretation,79 fit nicely within the com-
mon law system. These prohibitions represent the antithesis of a code
system where ideally all legal obligations are spelled out in specific provi-
sions of the civil code.80 Second, the effectiveness of broad prohibitions
in the Peruvian legal system would be undermined by both the lack of
confidence in the judicial system and an unwillingness to devote the tre-
mendous amount of resources to the interpretation of competition laws
that routinely takes place in the United States, and to a lesser extent in
the EEC. In order to be effective, the system of Peruvian competition
law must be spelled out in sufficient detail so a limited and strained judi-
ciary can apply new provisions in an even-handed manner, pursuant to
the rules of interpretation already in existence for litigation in a civil law
system.
Following the approach of the intergovernmental group of experts
on restrictive business practices appointed by the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, 8' a series of specifically prohibited re-
strictive business practice agreements can be set forth for adoption in
Peru. These specific prohibitions would apply to any agreement, written
or unwritten, legally enforceable or not, without regard to the location of
its execution which have the intent or effect of:
(a) the fixing of prices of goods or services between competitors;
(b) collusive tendering or bid rigging among competitors;
(c) agreements among competitors to allocate markets or customers;
(d) agreements among competitors to allocate sales and production on
a quota basis;
(e) collective refusals to deal among competitors;
79 United States Antitrust Law can be properly characterized as the federalization of the com-
mon law of restraint of trade. See generally, P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 50-
51 (1988); H. THORELLi, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 181-84 (1954).
80 CIVIL LAW, supra note 33, at 30.
81 The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restric-
tive Business Practices [hereinafter, Multilateral Principles].
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(f) collective refusals to supply among competitors;
(g) collective refusals to permit access to specified facilities essential for
competition; and
(h) agreements fixing the resale price of goods or services.
The above agreements, with the exception of the prohibition against
resale price maintenance, can all be characterized as horizontal agree-
ments among competitors. As a starting place for any antitrust system,
such agreements represent hard core violations of free competition which
typically have no redeeming social value to consumers.8 2 In addition to
being supported by the consensus of nations with competition law sys-
tems,83 limiting the prohibition of agreements to horizontal collusion
among competitors has the advantage of ease of codification and enforce-
ability, which will be vital to the effective enforcement of new competi-
tion law.
In addition, resale price maintenance should also be prohibited. Un-
like the prohibition against agreements among competitors, the fixing of
resale prices is a vertical agreement involving the actions of both a manu-
facturer and a distributor or retailer. A prohibition against resale price
maintenance, while not altogether uncontroversial,84 has the benefit of
protecting consumers in a country where individual industry segments
may typically be dominated by a single seller. In addition, prohibitions
against resale price maintenance represent a continuation of the con-
sumerist tradition which has characterized Peruvian antitrust law to
date.85
In addition to restrictive agreements among competitors, any system
of competition law must also restrain the acts of dominant firms which
may unilaterally restrict competition. While the American standards of
"monopolization" 86 or "attempted monopolization"87 are both too vague
for application in Peru, and too costly in terms of the expenditure of
resources, the European term "abuse of a dominant position"8 8 can be
effectively applied to the Peruvian legal system.
The term "abuse of a dominant position" must however be clearly
defined. While the use of presumptions of market power based on mar-
ket share is not a sophisticated measure of true economic power, such
measures may have application in a legal system without the resources to
82 United States v. Socomy-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 224, n.59 (1940).
83 Multilateral Principles, supra note 81.
84 United States commentators are engaged in a lively debate whether resale price maintenance
should continue to be per se unreasonable, subject to a rule of reason analysis, or presumptively
lawful.
85 See supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
86 Sherman Act, supra note 1, § 2.
87 Id.
88 Treaty of Rome, supra note 17, art. 86.
19891
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undertake the elaborate measurements of economic power as undertaken
in the United States and the EEC. Courts in the United States have
themselves adopted the benchmark that 90% market share represents
monopoly power, 60% market share might represent monopoly power,
and 30% market share was insufficient.89 Since the term "abuse of a
dominant position" suggests a status in the market somewhat short of
monopolization, even a 50% market share could be adopted as a pre-
sumption of a dominant position subject to rebuttal by any defendant or
respondent. In order to be effective, this benchmark of market power
should be applied to both individual firms and firms acting in concert
which together possess the necessary market share.
The concept of what constitutes an abuse of a dominant position
should also include such unilateral acts as:
(a) predatory acts against competitors which affect competition;
(b) unilateral acts of resale price maintenance;
(c) misuse of intellectual property right to impede either import trans-
actions or sales on the national market; and
(d) mergers, acquisitions, takeovers and joint ventures among com-
petitors.
The most difficult task will be the development of rules prohibiting
an abuse of a dominant position which can be applied with fairness, clar-
ity, and efficiency in a civil law system. Such concerns suggest that Peru
opt against antitrust rules involving market structure and emphasize less
complicated rules based on prohibiting specific conduct. However, con-
duct based rules can only lessen, but not eliminate, the need to obtain
some measure of market power in prohibiting the abuse of a dominant
position. Determining whether a firm has market power, or a dominant
position, remains a threshold issue which must be resolved before deter-
mining whether any potential abuse of such power or position should be
outlawed.
U.S. and EEC law again provide an example to be avoided. Under
U.S. law, monopolization and attempted monopolization cases turn into
an endless process of discovery and economy analysis in order to define
relevant geographic and product markets, to then permit the calculation
of a market share of a particular firm.90 The relevant market would in-
clude not only all firms actually producing a particular product but all
firms which could switch production to that product along with foreign
firms who could import the product in the event of a substantial price
rise.91 In addition, the United States Supreme Court and the Depart-
ment of Justice caution that even such a comprehensive calculation of
89 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
90 W. HOLMES, 1988 ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK §§ 2.01-2.07 (1988).
91 Id.
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market share is only the beginning of an examination of all economic
factors to determine whether a firm has substantial market power.92
The concept of a dominant position in EEC competition law is de-
fined as a position of economic strength enjoyed by a company vis-a-vis
its competitors which enables it to prevent effective competition in a rele-
vant market.9" While not as rigid a concept as "monopoly power," proof
of a dominant position still requires analysis of market share data as the
beginning of an analysis of a variety of economic factors to determine the
existence and abuse of a dominant position in a particular market
setting. 94
Such open-ended provisions are unsuitable for Peru since they defy
codification, provide virtually no guidance to the business community or
government, and are prohibitively expensive to enforce.
There are more workable rules which nonetheless achieve the pur-
pose of determining whether a firm is sufficiently powerful where its ac-
tions run a very real risk of injuring consumers. Sales and census data
when applied on a "line of business" basis provide a rough measure of
market share in many industries. Such data combined with a presump-
tion of 50% market share as a dominant position would identify with
some measure of specificity those firms prohibited from undertaking cer-
tain specified business practices because of the likelihood that such con-
duct would constitute the abuse of a dominant position.
While such an approach does not purport to reflect economic preci-
sion, it does purport to set forth intelligible standards and rules so that
the business community and the government can plan in advance its con-
duct with an understanding of the law. While such rules may not yield
results which would always please an economist, they are replacing a
system where there are effectively no rules at all.
C. Enforcement Mechanisms
Competition rules are rarely self-executing. Violations are often
done secretively and are well-concealed. Competition law must be en-
forced by some party with the resources and expertise to investigate and
prosecute violations of the law.
Antitrust enforcement in the United States is split between the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The Depart-
ment of Justice has exclusive authority to prosecute criminal violations of
92 Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, issued June 14, 1982, revised June 14, 1984.
93 U. TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW 65-96 (1982); See generally, D. WYATT & A.
DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 288-321 (1980).
94 Id.
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the antitrust laws and possesses civil authority to investigate and prose-
cute other anticompetitive practices.95 The Federal Trade Commission
was created in 1914 to assist in the enforcement of the antitrust laws as
well as to investigate and enforce a variety of laws aimed at consumer
protection and fraudulent business practices.96 In addition, private law-
suits may be brought by any party injured in its business or property by
an antitrust violation.97
Enforcement of EEC competition law rests primarily with the Com-
mission of the European Communities. The Commission has broad pow-
ers to investigate and prosecute violation of EEC law. 98 While no
criminal sanctions for competition violations exist in the EEC, compa-
nies and individuals may be fined up to ten percent of annual sales.99
EEC competition law may also be enforced by private plaintiffs within
their own national legal system and compensatory damages for violation
of EEC competition law may be available through the national courts as
well.' °
It is most unlikely that Peru will ever adopt such elaborate enforce-
ment mechanisms. Even with recent cutbacks, the United States em-
ploys approximately 550 persons in the Antitrust Division alone.'0 1 In
the European Commission, Directorate General IV employs 274 persons
to enforce the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome.'02
This is a burden that Peru cannot and should not bear. A much
smaller number of lawyers within the Ministry of Justice could develop
the expertise necessary to bring test cases enforcing the key provisions of
the new law.
Government cases would, by necessity, be supplemented by private
lawsuits. Such suits would be in the nature of tort actions where a busi-
ness or consumer would have been injured by a violation of the law. No
government, regardless of resources, can investigate, let alone prosecute,
all the complaints it receives from persons alleging a violation of law. A
95 Sherman Act, supra note 1, §§ 1, 2, 9, 15(a).
96 Id. §§ 41-58.
97 Id. § 15.
98 Regulation 17/62 J.O. 1962, 204, O.J. 1959-62, 87 [hereinafter Regulation 17].
99 Id. arts. 15(2) and (3).
100 Garden Cottage Foods, Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board, 2 All E.R. 770 (1983) (discharge of
injunction in action under European Economic Community Treaty, Article 86, on grounds that
adequate remedy in damages available).
101 Statement of Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divisions Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives concerning the Antitrust Division's Fiscal Year 1989 Authorization, March 3, 1988. This
figure would not include personnel at the Federal Trade Commission and other federal agencies with
competition responsibilities.
102 Written question No. 1615/86 by Mr. Francois Roelants du Vivier (ARC-B) to the Com-
mission of the European Communities (March 17, 1987).
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private right of action is necessary to allow a victim of anticompetitive
conduct to seek relief where the government cannot or will not take
action.
Allowing private lawsuits will not in all likelihood result in any
great burden to the judiciary. Unlike the United States, the civil code
would not permit treble damages or contingency fees to attorneys nor
does the Peruvian System permit extensive pretrial discovery which U.S.
litigants often utilize in the hope of uncovering a violation in antitrust
litigation. The lack of such incentives, the less litigious nature of the
Peruvian legal system, and the expense and delay of any litigation sug-
gests that a new Peruvian competition law regime would not generate a
large volume of frivolous claims. Instead, such a system can remedy bla-
tant anticompetitive conduct that is not currently subject to any effective
prohibition or regulation.
It is unlikely that Peru could or should adopt criminal penalties for
anticompetitive agreements. It would be extremely difficult to amend the
criminal code of Peru to incorporate such penalties. The only current
criminal sanction for conduct arguably related to competition is Legisla-
tive Decree 133. Legislative Decree 133 covers only the speculation in
certain goods and illegal storage of goods to raise market prices. 103 This
provision does not provide a legal base for the application of such provi-
sions to traditional anticompetitive conduct given the constitutional and
legal principles in Peru that criminal laws are not to be applied by
analogy.
Nor is there the political will to amend the criminal code to provide
provisions more broadly applicable to anticompetitive conduct. While
the enactment of the criminal portions of the Sherman Act in the United
States occurred in a context of strong public awareness of the effects of
restraints of trade and support for criminal sanctions, such a situation
does not exist in Peru. Nor are the Constitutional principles of free com-
merce and competition as absolute or strong in Peru as in the United
States. Unlike the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
Peru, in contrast, declares in its constitution the establishment of a "so-
cial market economy" in which other factors from market principles are
elevated to constitutional importance. Without such broad popular sup-
port for criminal penalties, Peruvian competition law, as in the EEC, will
remain a matter of civil penalties and fines.
CONCLUSION
Peru, like any developing nation committed to a market economy,
can benefit from an effective system of competition law if properly tai-
103 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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lored to the needs of the national economy. The country's fragile econ-
omy can ill afford the additional burdens and inefficiencies imposed by
the restricted output and higher prices imposed by cartels and individual
firms with substantial market power. Neither can the country afford the
drain of an additional and costly layer of bureaucracy or the costs of
lengthy and uncertain litigation.
Peru's current regime of competition laws represent an incomplete
step in this direction. As currently drafted, these laws are effective on
paper only. The laws lack implementing regulations and have been ap-
plied in a highly discretionary and inconsistent manner.
These weaknesses are not surprising in view of the fact that laws are
basically aimed at consumer protection concerns and cannot function ef-
fectively as antitrust laws. The existing laws must be supplemented with
a set of true competition laws aimed at the control of market power.
Formal and informal agreements between competitors with respect to
price, quantity, and allocation of territories or customers must be prohib-
ited. Similarly, the abuse of a dominant position by dominant firms
against the interests of consumers and competitors must similarly be
restrained.
The challenge is to devise a system whose costs are not so prohibi-
tive where the cure may be worse than the disease. Peru must reject the
worst excesses of both the United States and the EEC systems. While
each system works reasonably well within its own setting, neither is ap-
propriate for Peru. The United States system embroils its litigants in
lengthy and expensive court proceedings which can last decades and in-
volve complex economic principles which cannot be applied with cer-
tainty in advance of litigation. The European system involves a
cumbersome bureaucracy reviewing the registration of all agreements
raising competitive concerns. The EEC system by necessity involves a
prohibitively expensive government investigation, litigation and delays of
years for an applicant to receive formal approval for proposed business
conduct.
Both of these systems are simply too complex, too expensive and
time-consuming to serve Peru's interests in further developing competi-
tion law. Peru must develop rules which can be applied by a small staff
of government prosecutors in significant test cases and private litigants as
part of the framework of private commercial law. A Peruvian competi-
tion law as outlined above represents a new approach to an old problem
and an opportunity to contribute to the stability and development of the
Peruvian economy.t
t By agreement, the Journal has relied on the authors for the Peruvian law sources not avail-
able in the United States.
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